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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Numerous civil conflicts exist in today’s global environment. In addition to these current 
conflicts, the after effects of numerous prior conflicts are still felt socially and economically. Civil 
conflicts, averaging roughly seven years in length, carry tremendous social and economic costs1 
which can take years, even decades, to overcome. Billions of dollars of investment and donation 
are required to facilitate recovery. With these ever increasing social and economic costs, two 
factors become increasingly imperative: (1) understanding what factors affect the onset of civil 
conflict, and (2) how they can be addressed given enough forewarning to prevent the outbreak 
of conflict. Issues such as levels of economic development, population size & density, 
government type & strength, and ethnic fractionalization are all linked to the onset of civil 
conflict. 
 In this paper I focus on the onset of civil conflict and draw on a large body of economic 
and social literature discussing the onset of civil conflict in order to generate testable 
hypotheses regarding the effect of unemployment on civil conflict onset. Unemployment is both 
a social and an economic factor. While much of the prior literature has tried to separate the two 
issues, looking for predominantly social or economic reasons for the onset of civil conflict, it is 
only in some of the most recent literature that a link between the two areas has been studied. I 
test these hypotheses empirically using a data set I have compiled2.  
 One might observe now, at the peak of a global economic crisis, as well as throughout 
history, a pillar in most political campaigns and policy agendas has been the creation of jobs 
and the reduction of levels in unemployment. Political and social tensions rise in conjunction 
with rising unemployment, as increasing numbers of citizens lose their jobs and turn to their 
government for aid. Correspondingly, increasing stress gets placed on the government as it 
                                                            
1 Collier (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004b) reports the average length of civil wars at seven years and the rough economic 
cost for each at $54 Billion in damages over time on the intrastate and international levels. 
2 The data set contains 184 countries observed annually across a 48 year period from 1960‐2007. 
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attempts to address the issue. If levels of unemployment get too high or are sustained for too 
long, conflict can occur as people resort to violence and other desperate measures. Conflict 
may occur between non-governmental groups or against the state as groups lash out in 
frustration. 
 In many states or societies unemployment is likely to be an economic factor that can be 
manipulated by politicians to sway individuals and groups along the conservative/liberal 
spectrum and pit upper classes versus the lower and working classes. However, in states with 
ethnically3 divided populations it has the ability to become an identity based factor. In some 
states, i.e. Northern Ireland, society and government are divided along lines of ethnic 
orientation. With the parties controlling government divided by ethnic or religious classification 
and the population itself divided closely between ethnic groups, unemployment becomes an ‘us 
versus them’ issue, rather than a class issue or a conservative/liberal issue which could cut 
across ethnic groups. In cases such as this, as unemployment levels rise, politicians and social 
elites may manipulate the issue, turning groups against each other for political gain. While all 
ethnic groups may be suffering to roughly the same extent, framing of the issue by politicians 
may create the perception that one group is suffering at the benefit of an alternative group, or 
that one group is suffering more. This can increase tensions between groups and potentially 
lead to conflict if unemployment levels get too high. Therefore I argue that unemployment 
becomes an even more critical factor in areas of ethnic dominance4. 
                                                            
3 In referencing ethnicity, I defer to Horowitz’s definition of ethnicity: Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive 
differences, whether the indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, 
or some combination thereof… This is an inclusive concept of ethnicity [that facilitates] comparison (1985, 17‐18). 
4An area is classified as having a dominant ethnic group or a group is given the classification of ethnic dominance if 
the population of one group makes up between 45‐90% of the overall population (Collier, Hoeffler, & Sambanis, 
2005). 
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 In the next chapter I review the prior literature on the occurrence of civil war. In chapter 
3, I present a theoretical argument regarding the effects that unemployment and ethnic 
fractionalization have on the onset of civil conflict. In chapter 4 I describe the data set and 
discuss the statistical methods utilized in this study. In chapter 5 I present the empirical results, 
discussing the effects of unemployment on civil conflict, and conclude in chapter 6 with 
suggestions for the future direction of this research. 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 Foundation Works: Revolution Theory 
 Contemporary analyses of the factors leading to the onset and duration of civil war trace 
their roots to early social revolution literature which focused on social and economic inequalities 
as the root causes of political violence and revolution. De Tocqueville’s classic hypothesis 
stated: “Almost all of the revolutions which have changed the aspect of nations have been made 
to consolidate or to destroy inequality. Remove the secondary causes which have produced the 
great convulsions of the world and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the 
bottom,” ([1835] 1961, p. 302). Later works followed the effects social inequality had on 
revolution and incidents of political violence. Russett (1964) and Nagel (1974) found minor 
support for the link between political violence and inequality tied to the distribution of land. Nagel 
(1974) identified the level of economic well being within a state as the most important variable 
linking the two rather than the distribution of land. Skocpol (1979) evaluated the effects of class 
inequalities and suppression of the lower classes by the landowning elites and wealthy 
merchant classes. Despite Nagel’s (1974) claim that economic well being was the key link 
between political violence and inequality, later studies (Sigelman & Simpson, 1977; Hardy, 
1979; and Weede, 1981) found that once controlled for, economic development has little affect 
on income inequality and political violence. 
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Huntington (1968) focused primarily on the process of modernization within states, but 
he also drew a link between the rates at which states developed (or modernized) and how 
stable they remained. He observed that as states experienced increased rates of modernization, 
they experienced greater likelihoods of destabilization as social institutions were unable to 
evolve rapidly enough to adequately cope with social demands. He speculated that as social 
demands failed to be met, groups would lose faith in the state and attempt to remove the 
government. Most prominent among these groups would be state militaries who took over via 
coup. While Huntington’s focus was primarily on the structure of the state, Gurr (1970) focused 
on the distribution of income and equality among society within the state. Gurr hypothesized that 
as the level of inequality of income between groups rose within the state, the potential for 
political violence would increase. Gurr expanded upon this hypothesis theoretically and 
historically but did little in the way of quantitative analysis to test his hypothesis, possibly due to 
the lack of available data on the observed cases.   
Rebellion Theory: Resource Mobilization 
 Shifting away from the focus of economic inequality and its link to revolution and the use 
of political violence, another body of literature focused on the ability of dissident groups to 
mobilize through their ability to acquire necessary resources in order to finance and support 
themselves. Called by some the “resource mobilization school”, this body of literature (Gamson, 
1975; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977; Tilly, 1975, 1978) casts doubts on the idea of a strong direct 
relationship between discontent and political violence. Scholars in this school argued that the 
central explanatory variable was the opportunity of discontent to organize people into effective 
dissident groups. This argument focused on the ability of dissident groups to acquire and control 
the necessary resources for the pursuit of collective goods. One key aspect was the structure of 
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the political environment in which dissident groups formed, i.e. weak vs. strong governments 
and autocratic vs. democratic regimes. 
Eisinger (1973) argued that the more oppressive or closed a political system, the less 
opportunity there was for dissident groups to engage in collective action of any type. 
Alternatively, the more open a political system, the lower the likelihood of political violence as 
dissident groups are able to pursue collective action issues through more peaceful and 
democratic measures. Political systems falling within the middle range of the autocratic-
democratic spectrum, moderately autocratic to moderately democratic, are seen as the most 
likely to experience civil conflict, primarily as a result of weaknesses in state capacity (ie. weak 
militaries, inability to enforce laws, and corrupt institutions). Weak autocratic and democratic 
regimes lack strength to suppress rebellion groups and protests. The nature of the governments 
are often such that the people view their options as limited only to extreme, often violent, 
measures in order to change the political climate. While the style of government has social 
implications, this body of literature viewed it only as an enabler/inhibitor for conflict and focused 
the basis of the argument on the ability of groups to receive adequate economic backing to 
mount a rebellion.  
This argument received additional statistical backing in more contemporary discussions 
on the outbreak of civil war (Collier& Hoeffler 2001, 2002a, Sambanis 2001, and Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003). These researchers showed that, with all other factors controlled for, highly 
democratic and autocratic governments are unlikely to experience civil conflict, while weak 
autocratic or democratic governments are more susceptible to civil conflict. Measurement of 
government strengths and types are taken primarily from the Freedom House5 and Polity6 
                                                            
5 www.freedomhouse.org/ 
6 www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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indexes. A significant failure in this literature is its lack of discussion on the varying effects that 
government style can have on identity (ethnic) based civil wars. Primarily, are highly autocratic 
governments less likely to experience conflict in general or could they be just as susceptible in 
ethnically dominant states where one ethnic group controls the government and suppresses or 
oppresses another ethnic group? 
 Building on the theory of resource mobilization, the focus shifted to the use of 
econometric models to forecast or predict the onset of civil war in states. Early work on the 
modeling of the onset of civil war was developed by Grossman (1991, 1999) who derived much 
of his work from economic theory literature. Grossman, utilizing econometric models, cast 
rebellion as an industry that generates profit from the looting of local resources. He argued that 
rebellions are motivated by greed. Thus, so long as there is ample opportunity for profits to be 
extracted, the likelihood of rebellion formation will be strong. Simply put, merely the presence of 
lootable resources is necessary for the formation of rebel groups. This argument again suffers 
the same fault as the earlier research: it only observes rebellion through an economic lens and 
fails to apply a social filter to the analysis.  
Rebellion Theory: Greed vs. Grievance 
In contrast, much of the political science literature explains rebellion in terms of motive. 
Hirshleifer (1995, 2000) presents the argument that the presence of grievances, actual and 
imagined (or misperceived), present the primary motives for rebellion. These grievances are 
collectively referred to as identity based issues and can come from ethnic and social divisions 
within society that generate(sometimes incorrectly) identity based perceptions of inequality, 
leading to rebellion by groups with the perceived grievance. While Hirshleifer sheds important 
light on the issues of inequality and identity as they relate to civil conflict, he fails to discuss any 
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link with previously identified economic factors, or, more explicitly, the importance of opportunity 
for rebellion, or of factors that make it more feasible. 
Stemming from this divide in the argument over the causes of civil war, Collier & Hoeffler 
(2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, and Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis 2005) attempt to settle the debate 
through what they present as the “Greed7 vs. Grievance8” model. Utilizing a number of proxies 
for both greed oriented motivations and grievance oriented motivations, Collier and Hoeffler 
constructed a series of models to test the competing arguments.  In their first model, the greed 
or opportunity model, they tested the argument for the effects of greed motivated factors in 
relation to the onset of civil war. In this model they presented a basket of proxy variables for 
economic opportunity, measuring the cost/benefit ratio of rebel involvement and weighing the 
potential opportunity cost individuals face in the participation of rebel activities. They briefly 
mentioned unemployment as a possible economic factor but brushed it under the table with little 
explanation and instead utilized male secondary schooling as their proxy for measuring 
opportunity cost to participate in rebel activities. 
In the second model they tested for the effects of grievance motivated factors in relation 
to the onset of civil war such as ethnic fractionalization and openness of government. Following 
these two models, Collier & Hoeffler tested a series of models combining proxies from the first 
two models. They found that while the greed model holds only marginally better explanatory 
power over the grievance model for the onset of civil war, certain elements of the “Grievance” 
model have significant relationships to the onset of civil war. Opportunity proxies associated 
with a significant relationship to the onset of civil war are: Primary Commodity exports, Male 
                                                            
7 The Greed model focuses on economic incentives and entitlements that would motivate individuals and groups 
to undertake rebel actions. 
8 The Grievance model focuses on social and political elements that cause discontent and would provide incentive 
for individuals and groups to undertake rebel actions. 
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Secondary schooling9, GDP per capita, and GPD Growth in the prior five year period. Proxies 
from the grievance model associated with a significant relationship are: Ethnic Fractionalization, 
and Regime type. Proxies in both models associated with a significant relationship that are 
classed as neither greed nor grievance are: Peace duration, Population Size, and Geographic 
dispersion of the population. While still leaving more questions unanswered than answered, 
these works provide the basis for the emergence of the combined social and economic body of 
literature. 
Shifting away from the greed focus, other branches of the contemporary literature have 
attempted to disaggregate the types of civil war into classes of ethnic civil wars and 
economic/opportunity based civil wars or identity and non-identity based wars (Sambanis, 2001; 
Collier & Sambanis, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; and Fearon, 2005).  This group of literature 
separates civil wars between those fought over control of local resources (i.e. drugs, diamonds, 
lumber, oil, and other minerals) and those fought between ethnic and cultural groups for political 
control of a state or region. Sambanis (2001)10 notes that ethnic/religious, or identity based, civil 
wars are significantly and positively correlated with ethnic heterogeneity. Additional support for 
these findings are presented through various statistical models that analyze the effects of ethnic 
and cultural fractionalization in relationship to civil war onset in areas with little economic 
motivation for profit-seeking or greed-based civil wars11. 
Rebellion Theory: Greed & Grievance 
While much of the Rebellion Theory literature developing out of Revolution Theory has 
focused specifically on either economic or social causes for conflict, a small body of literature 
                                                            
9 This paper challenges the assumption that Male secondary schooling is a proxy for opportunity for rebellion. I 
argue here that education is not a necessary deterrent for conflict but instead the presence of employment 
opportunities that are a necessary deterrent for conflict. 
10 Also see Doyle & Sambanis (2000) 
11 See Fearon & Laitin (2003), Reynal Querol (2002), and Fearon (2005) 
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has focused on the combined interactions of both. Edward Muller (1985) examined the effects of 
income inequality and regime repressiveness on the occurrence of political violence. Drawing 
primarily on Gurr (1970) and Eisinger’s (1973) early works, Muller theorized that as income 
inequality grows within a society the likelihood for conflict increases. Drawing on Eisinger 
(1973), he added that conflict would be most likely under regimes that fell in the middle of the 
autocratic-democratic spectrum; highly repressive regimes are able to more effectively manage 
discontent and highly democratic regimes offer means for discontent to be voiced through 
means other than violence. Muller found support for his hypothesis, but found diminishing 
support for the effect of income inequality on political violence in his later time-series data.  
The issue of the interplay and influence of social and economic factors on conflict was 
later examined by Christopher Cramer (2003), who looked at the issue of inequality between 
groups and how social institutions reinforce these inequalities. Drawing on sociological and 
economic literature, Cramer theorized that ‘categorical inequality’ (inequality that is specific to 
defined groups within society) is a primary cause of conflict. He emphasized that the institutional 
setup of states and their societies reinforces these inequalities and further increases the 
likelihood for conflict by leaving social groups little alternative beyond violent conflict in order to 
improve their situation. Cramer tested this theory through two case studies on Angola and 
Rwanda. While providing an interesting argument for the link between economic and social 
factors, Cramer did little but suggest that these factors were linked.  
Despite this limitation, Cramer provided a theoretical basis for the work of Bendikt Korf 
(2005). Korf approached the Greed vs. Grievance nexus and attempted to link the two by 
focusing on the institutional mechanisms that preserve ethnic entitlements. Korf theorized that in 
highly divided or heterogeneous societies, ethnic groups which “gain political control will then 
also enrich themselves economically and share benefits within their own ethnic realms,” (p. 202, 
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2005). As this enrichment occurs, horizontal inequalities between groups in political, economic, 
and social dimensions will widen, providing the basis for intergroup animosity and conflict. Korf, 
like Cramer, used case study analysis but presented little beyond anecdotal evidence to support 
the theory. In addition, Korf only explored the inequality of land rights within a state or region.  
Land rights are important in lesser developed or undeveloped states where agriculture 
and other commodities make up a majority of the economy, but I argue that they are less 
significant to the majority of individuals in states that are more developed and industrialized. In 
these states, larger portions of the population are concentrated in urban areas where it is less 
important whether an individual owns land or property. Instead, the focus is on whether they are 
able to provide basic necessities for themselves: i.e. food, shelter, and healthcare. In developed 
societies, the issue of employment, or more specifically unemployment, is a significant factor for 
the onset of civil conflict. It is a tool which can be politicized and used to mobilize large numbers 
of individuals with a limited amount of resources. While much analysis has been done in regards 
to inequality and its effects on civil conflict, only passing attention has been given to 
unemployment and its effects on civil conflict. Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis (2005) make 
mention of unemployment as a contributing factor in the onset of civil conflict but do not 
operationalize it in any of their greed or grievance models. Beyond their discussion of 
unemployment, the issue has received no more than a single sentence discussion in any of the 
other literature. I aim to address this omission.  
Chapter 3 - Theory 
 As noted earlier, I use the case of Northern Ireland to develop a theoretical argument for 
the effects of unemployment on conflict onset and then test it using a sample of 184 countries. 
Northern Ireland is a semi-autonomous region that is comprised predominantly of two ethnic 
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groups: the Catholics and the Protestants12. In each of the six counties comprising the region, 
Protestants constituted a majority of the population and the government was held in the hands 
of protestant controlled Great Britain. Under Protestant rule, the Protestant community 
experienced favorable economic and employment opportunity. The Troubles developed out of a 
civil rights movement by the Catholic community that the British Government responded to with 
violence. One of the driving elements behind the civil rights movement was the demand for fair 
employment opportunities and access to jobs. Rising levels of unemployment during the late 
1960’s made these demands more urgent on the part of the Catholic community, but also made 
the Protestant community more resistant as they attempted to protect their own well being. 
While a peaceful civil rights movement was initially undertaken by the Catholic community in 
order to seek changes from the government, the government’s response to protest marches 
quickly devolved the movement into a violent conflict with groups aligning along ethnic lines. 
With levels of unemployment high within both the Catholic and Protestant communities, the 
ranks of paramilitary groups on both sides quickly swelled as individuals had little deterring them 
from joining. These groups had long been in existence, the IRA predominantly within the 
Catholic community seeking political change through any means necessary, and Ulster Unionist 
groups within the Protestant community seeking to protect the six counties of Northern Ireland’s 
union with Britain. It can be claimed that it was the rising levels of unemployment in the late 
1960’s that gave the paramilitaries on both sides the resource pool they needed to recruit 
individuals to their cause. 
                                                            
12 In the case of Northern Ireland, the designation of Catholic and Protestant is not used as much for religious 
designation as it is used to differentiate between descendants of the native Irish population (Catholics) and the 
immigrated population (Protestants) which settled on the island under British colonialism. 
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  Drawing on the theoretical foundations of Collier & Hoeffler’s (2001; 2002a; Collier, 
Hoeffler & Sambanis 2005) opportunity model, coupled with Muller’s (1985), Cramer’s (2003), 
and Korf’s (2005) models of inequality, I theorize that: 
H1: As the net level of unemployment increases (decreases) within 
a state, the probability for the outbreak of civil conflict will increase 
(decrease). 
 
 Building from the works of Gurr (1970) and Grossman (1991, 1999), and pulling from Mancur 
Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action,  I theorize that as the levels of unemployment rise, the 
opportunity cost of joining a rebellion decreases. In joining a rebellion, individuals often are 
faced with the decision to forgo incomes they might receive from alternative endeavors. As 
discussed by Kalyvas (2006), inclusion in rebel groups often takes or forces individuals from the 
areas in which they and their families are located. For many individuals the perceived benefits 
(short- & long-term) of joining a rebel group must be greater than what they might receive 
otherwise through employment and careers. In cases where employment rates are high, 
individuals are unlikely to see much financial benefit over alternative, non-violent options in 
addressing social grievances. In addition, in cases where individuals have families to support, 
the cost of abandoning current employment and guaranteed income is even greater. However, 
as unemployment levels rise, increasing numbers of individuals are faced with lower opportunity 
costs when presented with the opportunity of joining a rebel group. As more and more 
individuals become unemployed and the prospects for future employment appear non-existent, 
participation in rebel movements will increase, leading to increased probabilities for the outbreak 
of civil war.    
Collier & Hoeffler (2005) noted that most countries are governed by ethnically dominant 
majority groups (groups comprising between 45%-90% of the population). In autocratic states 
(both weak and strong) and in weak democratic states, the power of the state is likely to be held 
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by the ethnically dominant group, giving little or no opportunity for voice and representation to 
other ethnic groups. Only highly democratic states are less likely to experience civil conflict as 
they have political institutions in place to ensure that all groups receive fair representation and 
have the ability to voice and address grievances in a just and effective manner.  
Moreover, I theorize that there is an interactive effect between rising unemployment, 
ethnic dominance, and the onset of civil conflict. In states with ethnically dominant populations, 
increases in unemployment will increase horizontal inequality, or increase the perception that 
one group is suffering while other groups benefit. While preexisting divides may have been 
present between ethnic groups, these issues are likely to get repressed or overshadowed in 
times of economic prosperity. As economic shocks occur and unemployment levels rise, 
underlying cleavages between ethnic communities are likely to become strained. Drawing on 
Cramer (2003), Korf (2005), and Kalyvas (2006), I present the following hypothesis: 
H2: States with ethnically dominant populations will have a lower 
threshold for unemployment before conflict onset occurs than 
states without ethnically dominant populations. 
 
As unemployment rises, neighboring groups identifying with different ethnic backgrounds are 
likely to place blame for their misfortune on each other13. While these “grievances” may in some 
cases be misperceived, the resulting tensions between groups are likely to rise as 
unemployment rises, and the outbreak of civil conflict becomes imminent. In the next section I 
examine the effects of changing levels of unemployment on civil conflict in ethnically dominant 
states. I will present an empirical model designed to conduct a large N, cross-national time 
series utilizing the data set I have constructed.  
                                                            
13 While there is concern as to how the distribution of unemployment between groups may affect the onset of 
conflict, data pertaining to this distribution is only available for a select few of the cases observed. Future projects 
following this one will utilize case study analysis to analyze the distributed affects of unemployment on a handful 
of the available cases. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
In order to test the above theories, I will employ a cross-sectional time series14 utilizing a 
logit regression model in order to determine the probability for the outbreak of civil conflict. A 
logit model is most applicable in this situation as the dependent variable, the onset of conflict, 
will be a binary variable. The data set being used for this analysis is a brand new dataset that I 
have assembled from a variety of already existing datasets. The study will look at 184 countries 
with data from each year across the time period of 1960-2007. This provides for an initial 8,832 
case years of observation before any case drop occurs due to insufficient data or taking into 
account that not all countries included in the model existed for the entirety of the period 
observed. 
Primary Variables 
The dependent variable for all models to be run will be the onset of civil war within a 
country, coded (0) if no conflict occurred for the country in the observed year, (1) if conflict broke 
out in the observed year, and (-) if a conflict was observed within a country for a given year but 
the origin of the conflict occurred in a prior year. Occurrences for the outbreak of civil war are 
taken directly from the State Failures Project15. In some exceptional cases, occurrences of 
conflict are taken from prior studies conducted by Collier & Hoeffler (2001; 2002a; Collier, 
Hoeffler & Sambanis 2005). The occurrence of a civil war is defined as an armed conflict 
between the government and local rebels with the ability to mount some resistance. The 
violence must kill more than 1,000 individuals between both sides in a year to be classified as a 
civil war (Sambanis, 2004). In all, there are 171 observations of civil war onset, 7,695 
observations of non-occurrence, and 966 dropped observations due to ongoing conflict. These 
                                                            
14 See Harris, Richard, and Robert Sollis, Applied Time Series Modelling and Forecasting (2003) for information on 
cross sectional time series analysis. 
15 http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ 
  
15 
 
dropped observations are removed from the regression analysis as this study is concerned with 
factors affecting the onset of civil conflict and not its duration or termination.  
 In my model designed to test H1, unemployment will be the primary independent 
variable. Unemployment is measured as the percentage of the adult population reported as 
unemployed for each country year available from 1960-1999. Unemployment is lagged one time 
period in order to avoid any endogeneity issues. This measure is coded from (0) to (100). This 
data is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI)16 and International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO)17 data sets. The theoretical expectation is for the coefficient for 
unemployment to have a positive sign following regression analysis. The unemployment data 
utilized is the best available for each observation. In some cases, as reported by the WDI and 
the ILO, unemployment figures are for only the male portion of the population and in other cases 
it contains male and female unemployment for persons aged 15-64.  
 To test H2 I will rerun the model for H1 but will include a new variable: Ethnic Dominance. 
This variable will measure whether a country is comprised of an ethnically dominant majority 
group (groups comprising between 45%-90% of the population). If a country contains an 
ethnically dominant group, it receives a (1) for the observed year; all other observations receive 
a (0). In addition, this model will include an interacted variable generated by multiplying 
unemployment by ethnic dominance to test the interactive effect between the two variables. This 
model will contain all of the same control variables included in the first model. The theoretical 
expectation is for the coefficients for both ethnic dominance and unemployment is to have a 
positive sign following regression analysis. The coefficient for the interacted variable should also 
be positive to lend support for H2. 
                                                            
16 www.worldbank.org/ 
17 www.ilo.org 
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Control Variables 
Natural Log of GDP per Capita (lngdppc): The natural log of GDP per capita is taken 
for each country year in the observation. GDP per capita values (measured in constant 2005 
US$’s) are taken from the Penn World Tables, v. 6.318. GDP per capita is used as a measure of 
state capacity with the understanding being that as GDP per capita levels increase, state 
capacity to prevent civil war onset increases thus decreasing the probability for civil war 
outbreak. These values are logged with the theoretical understanding that increases in GDP per 
capita produce a diminishing overall increase in state capacity at higher levels than it does at 
lower levels. The coefficient is expected to have a negative sign following regression analysis. 
GDP per Capita Growtht-1 (gdppcgrwth_l): The percent increase of GDP per capita, 
measured from -.63% to 1.67% across all observations, is lagged one time period to observe 
the affect of growth in the prior year on the occurrence of civil war outbreak in the observed 
year. This data is taken from the Penn World Tables, v. 6.3. The coefficient is expected to have 
a negative sign following regression analysis. 
Natural Log of Population (lnpop): Population values are taken from the World 
Development Indicators and from the Penn World Tables, v. 6.3 for each country year and 
logged. The coefficient is expected to have a positive sign following regression analysis. 
Population Dispersion (popdisp): This is an index measure of the dispersion of the 
population within each country in the observation. This data is taken from Collier & Hoeffler’s 
(2002; 2005) data set. The measure of this index ranges from (0), indicating even distribution of 
the population across the country, to (1) indicating complete concentration of the population in 
one area. The coefficient is expected to have a negative sign following regression analysis. 
                                                            
18 pwt.econ.upenn.edu 
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Post Cold War (postcw): This is a dummy variable indicating if the observed country 
year occurred during the cold war or after the fall of the Soviet Union. Country years 1960 
through 1989 receive a zero while years 1990 through 1999 receive a (1). The coefficient is 
expected to have a negative sign following regression analysis. 
Prior Conflict (priorc): This is a dummy variable carried over from use in prior studies 
by Collier & Hoeffler (2001; 2002a; Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis 2005), Sambanis 2001, and 
Fearon & Laitin, 2003. This variable looks at each individual country year and lists a (0) if a 
conflict has not occurred within the previous ten years and a (1) if a conflict has occurred. This 
variable is used to account for legacy effects still present following the previous conflict such as 
inflated unemployment and faltering economies. The above research has found that on average 
it takes ten years for a country to fully overcome the effects of prior conflict. The coefficient is 
expected to have a positive sign following regression analysis. 
Table 4.1 - Variable 
Descriptions 
           
Variable Type Description 
Cwar DV 
Denotes whether a conflict occurred for the observed 
year 
Unemp IV Unemployment level for the observed year 
etdo4590 IV 
Denotes if a country has a group that is ethnically 
dominant 
lngdppc CV Natural log of GDP per capita (US $2005) 
Lnpop CV Natural log of the Population 
popgrwth CV Population Growth % from the prior year 
popdisp CV Concentration level of the population 
Postcw CV 
Dummy variable noting whether the observed year was 
after the end of the cold war 
Priorc CV 
Dummy Variable noting whether a conflict had occurred 
within the previous 10 observed years 
polity2 CV Polity IV score squared 
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Regime Score2 (polity2): This variable comes from the Polity IV19 data set which 
measures a state’s government on a scale from (-10) (completely autocratic) to (+10) 
(completely democratic). Due to the variable’s expectation to produce a parabolic effect, the 
variable is squared, giving a range from (0) to (100) in order to measure the linear effect of 
regime type. The coefficient is expected to have a negative sign following regression analysis. 
Chapter 5 -Statistical Analysis 
 Following regression analysis, we are presented with the results in Table 5.1 below. In 
the first regression model (column 1) we see the results from running a logit analysis against 
only the control variables as a test to see if the coefficients hold to their predicted directions. It is 
observed that the Ln of GDPpc, GDP Growtht-1, Population Dispersion, Post-Cold war, and the 
Polity2 coefficients all show a negative effect as predicted and all of them except Population 
dispersion come out as statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient for the Ln of 
Population comes out positive as predicted and is statistically significant. The surprise of the 
group is that the coefficient for Prior Conflict, which was predicted as having a positive sign, 
comes out as having a negative sign but is shown as not being statistically significant. This is 
possibly due to the fact that in all other prior studies, the time series analysis was done in 5 year 
blocks whereas this study analyzes on an annual basis, giving considerably more observations 
of the effect of prior conflict on conflict onset. The variables in this group allow for an initial 4,596 
observations with 139 occurrences of conflict onset present. 
 In the second regression model (column 2) we see the results for the model designed to 
test H1. Unemployment is added to the initial model run in column 1. The coefficients for the 
control variables all hold to their same directional effects and Population Dispersion and Prior 
Conflict continue to be statistically insignificant. The only variable which drops in its level of 
                                                            
19 www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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significance is GDP growth in the prior period which drops from the 1% level to the 5% level 
following the addition 
 of unemployment to the model. The coefficient for Unemployment, the variable of concern in 
the model, shows a positive sign as predicted and is shown to be statistically significant at the 
5% level, giving 
generous 
support for H1. 
Due to missing 
unemployment 
data, 
observations for 
this model drop 
to 1,846 with 31 
occurrences of 
conflict 
observed. While 
these numbers 
are not ideal, this 
level of case loss 
is in line with the 
level of case loss 
observed in 
similar studies 
discussed above 
Table 5.1 - Logit Regression Models   
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Unemployment   .072   .077 .155 
   (.033)**  (.034)** (.044)***
Ethnic Dominance   .204 .789 2.089 
    (.217) (.423)* (.701)***
Unem*Ethnic Dom     -.141 
      (.060)** 
Ln GDP per capita -.392 -.712 -.385 -.778 -.816 
  (.107)*** (.232)*** (.107)*** (.239)*** (.245)***
(GDP growth)t-1 -0.084 -.061 -.083 -0.056 -0.051 
  (.013)*** (.029)** (0123)*** (.028)** (.028)* 
Ln Population .301 .428 .294 .478 0.544 
  (.075)*** (.145)*** (.074)*** (.153)*** (.163)***
Population 
Dispersion -.442 -.893 -.408 -.831 -0.406 
  (.598) (1.181) (.593) (1.207) (1.282) 
Post-Cold War -.554 -.914 -.533 -0.941 -0.952 
  (.241)** (.439)** (.240)** (.448)** (.452)** 
Prior Conflict -.159 -0.463 -0.130 -.629 -0.735 
  (.246) (0.457) (0.247) (.476) (.476) 
Polity2 -.026 -0.026 -.026 -.025 -0.025 
  (.004)*** (.007)*** (.004)*** (.007)*** (.007)***
        
N 4596 1846 4511 1803 1803
No. of Wars       
Log Likelihood -529.17 
-
120.379 -527.789 
-
118.242 
-
115.358
Note: All regressions include a constant, standard errors are in parentheses 
*, **, & *** indicates significance at the 10, 5, & 1 % levels, respectively. 
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and is still able to produce results that give an understanding of how unemployment is affecting 
conflict onset. 
 In the final three models, the variable for 
Ethnic Dominance is added to the logit regression. The third regression model (column 3) 
displays the results for a model that drops unemployment and adds the variable for ethnic 
dominance. Once again, the coefficients for the control variables carry the same signs as they 
have in the prior two models and the significance for each remains the same as they did in the 
first model. However, while the coefficient for ethnic dominance carries the predicted positive 
sign, it does not show as statistically significant in this model. The variables in this model allow 
for 4,511 observations with 139 occurrences of conflict onset. In the fourth regression model 
(column 4) both Unemployment and Ethnic Dominance variables are added to the logit 
regression in order to begin testing H2. Once again, the signs for the coefficients of the control 
variables remain as they have for the prior three models and the significance levels for the 
coefficients remain the same as they were in the second model. The coefficient for 
Unemployment again shows a positive sign and remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The coefficient for ethnic dominance is again positive and for the first time shows statistical 
significance, for this model at the 10% level, indicating that any observed effect of ethnic 
dominance on conflict onset is more than just random. This also lends positive support for H2. 
Data limitations again drop the number of observations for this model to 1,803 with 31 
occurrences of civil conflict onset present. 
 The final model combines all of the discussed variables in order to fully test H2, adding 
the interacted variable of Unemployment & Ethnic Dominance to the fourth model. Once again, 
the signs for the coefficients of the control variables remain as they have for the prior three 
models and the significance levels for the coefficients remain the same as they were in the 
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second model with the exception of GDP growth in the prior period. In this model, the 
significance level drops to the 10% level. The coefficients for both Unemployment and Ethnic 
Dominance once again show the predicted signs and both show significance at the 1% level. 
However, while the coefficient for the interacted variable shows significance at the 5% level; its 
sign is opposite that predicted by H2. This result is troubling as it indicates that while 
unemployment is a significant explanatory variable for conflict onset when an ethnically 
dominant population is not present, it has no affect when an ethnically dominant population is 
present. The logit results indicate that when an ethnically dominant population is present, any 
increase in unemployment is nullified by the interactive affect between unemployment and 
ethnic dominance; ethnic dominance becomes the primary explanatory factor for conflict onset. 
 Despite limitations in the number of observations, statistical support is provided for H1 
but support is not shown for H2. While the coefficient for Unemployment is shown as having the 
predicted effect in models 2 & 5 and was statistically significant in both, the negative coefficient 
for the interacted variable invalidates H2. However, the negative coefficient for the interacted 
variable indicates the opposite for what is predicted in H2. The results of the final model indicate 
that unemployment is still a highly significant factor for the onset of civil conflict, but in areas that 
contain an ethnically dominant population its effect is nullified. In addition, the traditional 
variables from past research of Ln GDP per capita, GDP per Capita growtht-1, Ln Population, 
Post-Cold War, and Regime type all remained highly statistically significant and operated in the 
directions previously predicted. One key point of interest is that Population Dispersion was not 
statistically significant in any of the models whereas in prior studies20 it had shown statistical 
significance up to the 1% level. A probable reason for this change from prior studies could be 
due in part to the use of annual observations rather than observing five year blocks. On an 
                                                            
20 See Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis 2005 
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annual basis, Population dispersion levels change very little. This lack of change from year to 
year is likely to have diminished the statistical effect of Population Dispersion on conflict onset. 
In addition, by observing in five year blocks, if conflict occurs during a period, it is unclear 
whether the change in population concentrations occurred prior to the conflict or after the onset 
of the conflict. 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 This study focuses on the issue of civil conflict onset, asking what the effects of 
unemployment are on the occurrence of civil conflict.  It uses a similar research design to the 
one employed by Collier & Hoeffler (2001; 2002a; Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis 2005), 
Sambanis 2001, and Fearon & Laitin, 2003. I challenge the theoretical assumptions proposed in 
prior studies that attempt to separate the social and economic factors regarding the opportunity 
for rebellion to occur. This study improves on previous research by applying a new variable, 
unemployment. My results show that an increase in overall unemployment has a statistically 
significant effect on the increase in the probability of civil conflict so long as an ethnically 
dominant population is not present. In addition, this study expands on prior studies by analyzing 
individual countries on an annual basis rather than looking at averaged data in five year blocks 
as prior studies have21. By observing data in five year averaged blocks, it becomes questionable 
as to what is driving the data. If the occurrence of conflict onset occurs within the first years of 
the observed block, any changes in the data that are driving significance levels could be due to 
the conflict itself. By observing annually, you are able to avoid issues of endogeneity and 
instead observe the direct effects of the independent variables on the onset of civil conflict. The 
only true downside to observing on an annual basis is that the data becomes more susceptible 
                                                            
21 See Collier & Hoeffler (2001; 2002a; Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis 2005) 
  
23 
 
to case loss due to missing data. This was a perceivable issue in this study as numerous 
individual cases were dropped that would have remained in the analysis of a study utilizing five 
year averaged blocks. 
 This study also shows that while unemployment remained a statistically significant factor 
for conflict onset when coupled with ethnic dominance, it had a slightly diminished effect in 
cases where an ethnically dominant population was present. This went counter to the theory 
proposed by this paper that the presence of an ethnically dominant population should 
compound the effect that unemployment has in increasing the likelihood for conflict onset. This 
finding advances the study of the causes of ethnic and non-ethnic wars by suggesting that both 
conflicts may have different causes; however, it indicates that the ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts 
are intertwined.  
 Where does this leave us? This paper should only be the beginning of the focus on the 
effects of unemployment on conflict onset. The data here provides a spring board for future 
research regarding the effect of unemployment on civil conflict but needs to be expanded on 
drastically. Holes in the data need to be filled and additional variables need to be added to the 
regression models.  A more complete set of data can considerably strengthen my findings. In 
addition, in-depth case studies evaluating the issue of unemployment in cases of civil conflict 
are necessary to expand our understanding at the micro-level. As is often the case with large-N 
studies, macro level data may not always pan out when observed on a case by case basis. 
Underlying and intervening factors may be causing the effects witnessed at the macro-level and 
through the utilization of case studies, these factors can be uncovered. With this project I lay 
open a path for future research to take and further explore.  
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